Category Archives: Trademarks

Common Questions: When Should I Enforce My Trademark Rights?

by Christina Frangiosa

The short answer is: as soon as possible after you learn about potential infringement.

In the current economy, some trademark owners may be reluctant to incur litigation costs or to pursue enforcement actions against potential infringers, when they believe the cost of pursuit might outweigh the potential value of a license agreement or a settlement with the other party.

If trademark owners delay enforcing legitimate rights, however, they risk losing the ability to enforce their rights because of the delay. There are risks associated with a decision to not enforce the rights against a particular infringer, or to delay enforcement (generally). In other words, the trademark owner’s claims could be dismissed for failing to take corrective action promptly.

There are three basic doctrines that result in a loss of enforcement ability, if they are alleged successfully: acquiescence, laches and/or waiver. These three doctrines usually appear as affirmative defenses to an infringement lawsuit when trademark owners try to sue a specific infringer.

Acquiescence

Acquiescence occurs when a trademark owner exhibits some measure of agreement or implied consent to a potential infringer’s use of a substantially similar mark. See, e.g., Profitness Phys. Ther. Center v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic and Sports Phys. Ther. P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The elements of acquiescence are: (1) the senior user actively represented that it would not assert a right or a claim; (2) the delay between the active representation and assertion of the right or claim; and (3) the delay caused the defendant undue prejudice.”) (internal quotations omitted); Bunn-o-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Service, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (“To establish acquiescence, Bunn-NY must show that Bunn-IL by word or deed conveyed its implied consent to Bunn-NY’s use of the Bunn mark.”). This implied consent can come in the form of refusing or declining to file suit against a specific infringer or failing to otherwise object to an infringing use of the mark.

Laches 

Laches is defined as “neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity.” Black’s Law Dictionary. In other words, the delay caused harm to the defendant, and thus bars the owner’s ability to sue the defendant for infringement.

In order to get a case dismissed successfully under a laches theory, a defendant is not required to prove any intent to consent to the defendant’s specific use. Bunn-o-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Service, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (“Laches does not require proof of intent. . . . To prove laches, Bunn-NY must show (1) an unreasonable lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and (2) prejudice arising therefrom.”). Compared to acquiescence, where a defendant must show implied consent of a trademark owner, “laches implies a merely passive consent.” Profitness Phys. Ther. Center v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic and Sports Phys. Ther. P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Waiver 

Finally, a defendant can assert that a trademark owner waived its right to sue for infringement in this specific case. Wavier generally requires “the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” U.S. v. King Features Entm’t, 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1988). However, waiver is harder to prove than either acquiescence or laches because “it involves not sleeping on one’s rights but intentionally relinquishing them.” RE/MAX Int’l, Inc. v. Trendsetter Realty, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 679, 711 n.12 (S.D. Tex. 2009). It also requires supporting evidence that “so clearly” indicates an intent to relinquish a known right that any other reasonable explanation is simply excluded. Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Dundee Mills, Inc., 800 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986).

Conclusion

Failure to oppose a junior user’s similar trademark or simply failing to enforce one’s own trademark rights in a timely manner can result in an inability to pursue infringement remedies against others. It can result in consumer confusion about the source of goods or services provided in connection with the similar marks, and undermine the value of the trademark owner’s brand.

Because trademark owners necessarily have invested money and resources in developing their brands, and the consumer’s good will associated with those brands, it’s good practice to ensure that some enforcement mechanism is in place to protect these valuable assets. Trademark owners generally should avoid positioning themselves in any way that causes these defenses to become viable means to dismiss the lawsuit they’ve chosen to pursue.

(Note that there may be many reasons why enforcement of a trademark at a particular time should or should not be undertaken, each of which should be reviewed carefully with your attorney(s) in the context of the circumstances presented.)

New Bill Introduced in the House to Combat Online Piracy

by Christina Frangiosa


Today, a bipartisan group within the House of Representatives introduced a bill entitled, Stop Online Piracy Act (H.R. 3261) to combat online piracy. This Bill apparently acts as a counterpart to the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (“PROTECT IP Act,” S. 968) introduced in May 2011 in the Senate (see current status here). Sponsors of the House Bill include House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas), Ranking Member John Conyers (D-Mich.), IP Subcommittee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), Rep. Mary Bono-Mack (R-Calif.), Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-Calif.), Rep. Tim Griffin (R-Ark.), Rep. Dennis Ross (R-Fla.), and Rep. Lee Terry (R-Neb.).

The House issued a press release today to announce the Bill’s introduction. I haven’t had time to review the Bill in detail yet, but will post an update when available about the contents of the bill and differences from the Senate’s version.

My prior posts about the PROTECT IP Act, including hearings held by both the Senate and the House can be found here.

Facebook Sued for Trademark Infringement of “TIMELINES” Mark

by Christina Frangiosa


Timelines, Inc., has filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against Facebook, seeking to enjoin the launch of its new product, which it has marketed under the name “Timeline.” Plaintiff Timelines owns three federally registered trademarks on which it bases its suit: “TIMELINES” (Reg. No. 3,684,074); “TIMELINES.COM” (Reg. No. 3,764,134) and a graphic depiction of the word TIMELINES (Reg. No. 3,784,720). Each of these trademarks has been registered in Class 42 for: “Providing a web site that gives users the ability to create customized web pages featuring user-defined information about historical, current and upcoming events; and application service provider, namely, managing web sites of others in the fields of historical, current and upcoming events.” (Emphasis added).

In its Complaint, Plaintiff Timelines alleges that around September 23, 2011, it learned that Facebook was planning to launch a service called Timeline – and make it available as early as October 1 – which is described at https://www.facebook.com/about/timeline. (ECF No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 8; Pacer access required to access this document). (The link to Facebook’s explanation of its new Timeline product was active when I checked it this afternoon, but perhaps it will disappear (or be “inaccessible”) during the pendency of the lawsuit – particularly if a temporary restraining order (TRO) is issued.) Plaintiff Timelines alleges that “this service is identical or nearly identical to what Timeline offers” (id.), that Facebook knew it was causing confusion (id. ¶ 9) and that Facebook has now disabled access to Plaintiff Timelines’ own Facebook page (id. ¶ 10).

For context, Plaintiff Timelines explains that its own website has averaged approximately 97,000 visitors per month in 2011 and that it has “invested several million dollars into its business and has taken swift action to protect its Marks.” (Id. ¶¶ 24, 27).

Plaintiff Timelines alleges trademark infringement (§ 1114) based on likelihood of confusion deriving from a false implication of sponsorship or affiliation, and willful infringement, all resulting in claimed immediate and irreparable harm, leaving Timelines without an adequate remedy at law. (Id. ¶¶ 33-39). It also alleges false designation of origin (§ 1125), which it claims will improperly suggest a relationship between Timelines and Facebook and “destroy the source-identifying function and goodwill that Timelines has cultivated in its TIMELINES marks.” (Id. ¶ 43). Again, Timelines makes a claim of willful infringement on this second count. Timelines also seeks relief under state consumer fraud laws and the uniform deceptive trade practices act. (Id. ¶¶ 48-59).

Plaintiff Timelines seeks temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent Facebook from using TIMELINE or TIMELINES or anything confusingly similar as well as money damages and “any other relief the Court deems just.” (Id. ¶ 12). It seeks attorneys’ fees, court costs, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, Facebook’s profits, treble damages based on the willful infringement claim, and punitive damages pursuant to the consumer fraud claims. (Id. Prayer for Relief). It also seeks publication of corrective advertising and a written accounting by Facebook within thirty days of the entry of the order detailing the “manner and form” in which Facebook complied with the order.

There may be a typo in the Complaint – in the Prayer for Relief, Timelines requests “That Facebook recover its costs of court” – which makes no sense, so they must have meant to request “That Timelines recover its costs of court.” (Id. at page 11).

Plaintiff Timelines also filed its motion for TRO today, along with a memo of law in support. ECF Nos. 7 & 8, Civil Action No. 11-6867 (N.D. Ill.) (Pacer access required to access these documents). In its motion for TRO, it specifically requests that Facebook be prevented from using these trademarks, from launching the service using these trademarks, and be required to distribute corrective advertising to dispel the “false and misleading impression” caused by Facebook’s promotional materials to date. ECF No. 7. (In other words, it only seeks a TRO to prevent further damage caused by Facebook’s alleged actions – any monetary damage claims will be handled at a later point in this case.)

Counsel for Plaintiff Timelines are Douglas Alan Albritton and James Terrence Hultquist, of Reed Smith LLP, in Chicago. The case has been assigned to the Honorable John W. Darrah and Magistrate Judge the Honorable Nan R. Nolan. No appearance has yet been entered on Facebook’s behalf.

US Trade Representative Seeks Comments on 2011 Notorious Markets List

by Christina Frangiosa


The U.S. Trade Representative today released a request for public comment regarding its Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets. 76 Fed. Reg. 184 (published Sept. 22, 2011). In its summary of the request, the USTR explained:

“In 2010 the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) began publishing the notorious market list as an ‘Out of Cycle Review’ separately from the annual Special 301 report. This review of Notorious Markets (‘Notorious Markets List’) results in the publication of examples of Internet and physical markets that have been the subject of enforcement action or that may merit further investigation for possible intellectual property infringements. The Notorious Markets List does not represent a finding of violation of law, but rather is a summary of information that serves to highlight the problem of marketplaces that deal in infringing goods and which help sustain global piracy and counterfeiting. USTR is hereby requesting written submissions from the public identifying potential Internet and physical notorious markets that exist outside the United States and that may be included in the 2011 Notorious Markets List.
 

See summary (emphasis added).

The first Out-of-Cycle review of Notorious Markets was published in February 2011, following a similar request for public comments, and is available on the USTR site. The 2011 Annual Report (published in April 2011 with country reports and a watch list) is also available.

The deadline to respond with comments is October 26, 2011. Specifically, the USTR is looking for detailed information about potential markets “where counterfeit or pirated products are prevalent to such a degree that the market exemplifies the problem of marketplaces that deal in infringing goods and help sustain global piracy and counterfeiting.” Id. ¶ 2a. If possible, the USTR would like to see location of the market, principal owners/operators (if known), types of products sold, distributed or otherwise made available, volume of traffic of the website (such as the Alexa ranking), and any known enforcement activity against it (including any requests for takedown of infringing content and the site’s response). Id. ¶ 2b.

The USTR will maintain a docket of public comments received about these markets, which will be open for public inspection, except for certain confidential business information, pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 2006.13. This docket should be available here. (My apologies in advance if this link doesn’t work – there were no comments posted when I tested it, but I think the link will be active soon. As an alternative, visit http://www.regulations.gov/, search for public submission and enter “USTR-2011-0012” in the Keyword or ID field.)

Senate Judiciary Committee Issues Report on PROTECT IP Act

by Christina Frangiosa


As previously reported in this Blog, Senator Leahy introduced on May 12, 2011, the “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011” (S. 968) (the “PROTECT IP Act of 2011”). Just last week, Senator Leahy published the Committee’s Report on the Bill (S. Rep. 112-39, released July 22, 2011). In this Report, he explains why a legislative solution is necessary.

He identifies the “footwear, clothing, consumer electronics and pharmaceutical industries” as being frequent victims of such counterfeiting enterprises. S. Rep. at 3. He explains that “the music, motion picture, television, publishing and software industries” face continual threats from copyright infringement in the digital world. Id.

Indeed, the President and CEO of Rosetta Stone testified during the February 16, 2011 Judiciary Committee Hearing on this topic that pirated copies of the newest versions of Rosetta Stone software are made available through sites that at least facially appear legitimate, causing confused customers to purchase (essentially) defective software bearing Rosetta Stone’s name. Prepared Statement of Tom Adams, Feb. 16, 2011 at 2.

Author Scott Turow (speaking on behalf of the Authors’ Guild) testified that he published a new book in May of 2010, and within a week or two of its release, friends informed him that pirated copies of his book were available for sale online. Webcast of Scott Turow’s Tesimony is available through the Committee’s hearing notice. This type of counterfeiting poses not only additional costs on the authors/publishers, but can also cause physical harm to the customer if what is counterfeited is pharmaceutical, but yet is distributed bearing legitimate trademarks and other indicia of legitimacy.

The Committee Report summarized the various harms that result from this type of activity:

  • First, online infringement harms the content and trademark owners themselves in the form of lost sales, lost brand value, increased costs to protect their intellectual property, and decreased incentives to invest in research and development.
  • Second, online infringement harms consumers who receive lower quality products, inauthentic products, or, in a worst case scenario, products that cause physical harm or health risks.
  • Third, online infringement harms Federal and State Governments in the form of lost tax revenues, higher law enforcement costs, and the harm caused by the effects of the Government’s own purchase of counterfeit products.
  • Fourth, online infringement harms U.S. trade by lessening its ability to partner with countries that have weaker intellectual property enforcement regimes.21 Fifth, online infringement reduces the incentives to create and disseminate ideas which, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, harms the free expression principles of the First Amendment.
  • Finally, as Victoria Espinel, U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), noted in a hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, online infringement supports international organized crime syndicates, which pose risks to our national security. 

S. Rep. at 5 (footnotes omitted).

While a large portion of the Bill relates to government action that can be taken by the Attorney General, the private right of action included in this Bill provides separate benefits to rightsholders, allowing them to enforce their rights, independent of any action that the government may take against the wrongdoer. This private right of action is more limited than the enforcement tools provided to the AG.

As the Committee Report explains, while the private right of action can extend to websites operating outside of the U.S., “the resulting remedies are more limited [than those reserved for the Justice Department]. A qualifying plaintiff may only seek the court’s permission to serve a court order resulting from an action brought under this provision on a payment processor or online advertising network. Neither a DNS operator nor a search engine can be required to take action as the result of an order issued under this provision.” Id. at 8. As a result, private rightsholders cannot use this process to require that web hosting companies or search engines disable access to the domain name when it is found to be a “rogue Internet site.”

Moreover, when court orders are served on third parties (such as payment processors or search engines), no ongoing duty on the part of the third-party – for instance, to ensure that the infringing domain does not pop up again under a different name at a later time – will be established. Id. at 9. Instead, the third-party’s obligations begin and end with the court order served upon it – even then, the third party is only required to comply to the extent such compliance is “technically feasible and reasonable.” Id. This safe harbor allows third parties to avoid significant expenses that might result from having on-going, extensive obligations to police against the re-appearance of these rogue sites when they resuscitate themselves after a successful enforcement action.

This Bill also limits the remedies that a qualifying plaintiff can seek against a third-party who “knowingly and willfully” fails to comply. Id. Specifically, actions to enforce the order at issue will be limited to requiring compliance with it – “These provisions do not open the door to fishing expeditions in the form of frivolous litigation brought simply to initiate broad discovery.” Id. Monetary damages are also not available in these situations.

Notably, the drafters did not intend the Bill to deter voluntary action by third parties to police their own networks for infringing or counterfeiting activity, nor does it intend to allow the Bill to act as a substitute for such voluntary action. Id. at 10.

Overall, the Bill would provide needed assistance to rightsholders to continue to fight the battle against infringement and counterfeiting. It is not a complete solution, however. Even Senators who support this Bill recognize that it’s only the first step – but an important one nonetheless. See Prepared Statement of Sen. Leahy, May 26, 2011 (“The PROTECT IP Act targets the most egregious actors, and is an important first step to putting a stop to online piracy and the sale of counterfeit goods.”).

Background

In general, this Bill provides a remedy both to the Attorney General and to certain private rights holders (“Qualified Plaintiffs,” as specifically defined) to combat copyright infringement and counterfeiting against websites whose primary purpose is infringement or counterfeiting. The statutory definitions make this a bill of somewhat limited application (not every infringement will qualify, nor will every infringer, involved third-party or level of conduct), but it undoubtedly would provide rightsholders with another tool in the toolbox to enforce their valuable copyright and trademark rights.

In effect, this Bill constitutes an amendment to the COICA bill introduced last session, which did not reach a floor vote in the Senate before the session ended. (More on the COICA bill and related hearings can be found here.)

Senators Hatch, Grassley, Schumer, Feinstein, Whitehouse, Graham, Kohl, Coons and Blumenthal co-sponsored the PROTECT IP Bill, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on May 12. The Committee scheduled an executive business meeting on May 19, which was rescheduled for May 26 to consider the bill and to review proposed amendments. The Committee accepted both amendments and approved the bill unanimously by a voice vote. (The audio recording of the session – very short – can be found here: http://judiciary.senate.gov/webcast/5-26-11_Exec_Bus_Mtg.mp3. It also appears on the meeting announcement changing the date of the session to May 26.)

Following the announcement that the bill had passed the Committee on the Judiciary and was moving to the full Senate floor for consideration, Senator Wyden announced a hold on the motion to proceed to the bill, thus perhaps indefinitely tabling consideration of what seems to have been a substantial bi-partisan effort to combat a very real threat to American commerce.

The Bill has received both praise and criticism, with interest groups and other organizations going on record with their opinions about the Bill and its anticipated impact. (See my prior post for a short summary of some of the opinions that had already been made public before the Judiciary Committee voted on the bill on May 26. Undoubtedly, more groups have made their opinions public in the intervening months, but I have not searched since.)