The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights will hold a public hearing on September 21, 2011 at 2:00pm (Eastern) in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 226. The hearing is entitled, “The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?” The witness list has not yet been posted.
It appears the hearing will be simulcast over the web, through a link provided in the notice.
According to an opinion issued earlier this summer by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (N.J.), removing the photographer’s credit from a magazine copy of his photograph before re-using it can qualify as “copyright management information” for purposes of determining whether a defendant has violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), particularly 17 U.S.C. § 1202. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group, No. 10-2163, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11984 (3d Cir. June 14, 2011). Note that this opinion did not conclude whether or not the infringement occurred – just whether the removal of the photographer’s credit information that appeared in the “gutter” of a magazine could qualify as actionable removal of copyright management information under the DMCA. A determination of the substantive liabilities in this case has yet to be made.
Facts (according to the Third Circuit Opinion at pages 3-6)
Plaintiff Peter Murphy, a professional photographer, was hired in 2006 by New Jersey Monthly magazine to take the photograph of Craig Carton and Ray Rossi, two radio show hosts, who were to be named “best shock jocks” in an upcoming article. The photograph was risqué (showing Carton and Rossi “standing, apparently nude,” behind the radio station’s sign). Murphy retained copyright in the photo.
After the magazine was published, an employee of the radio station scanned the image (without the caption explaining the award or the gutter credit naming Murphy as the photographer) and posted it to the radio station’s web site and to another site. The radio station’s web site invited visitors to alter the image and submit it to the radio station for feedback. The radio station posted 26 of these alterations on its web site. At no time did the radio station or the hosts obtain Murphy’s permission to use the original or an altered version of the photo.
When Murphy found out about this use, his attorney sent a cease and desist letter to the radio station, demanding that the infringing use cease. Shortly thereafter, Carton and Rossi featured Murphy in one of their radio shows in which they allegedly recommended that listeners avoid doing business with him because “he would sue his business partners” and suggested that he was gay (despite his self-identification as a heterosexual married man with children of his own).
Claims
This lawsuit ensued. Murphy sued the radio station and the two hosts (collectively referred to in the opinion as “Station Defendants”) for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, violations of § 1202 of the DMCA, and defamation under NJ law. After denying Murphy’s requests for additional discovery relating to his defamation claim, the Trial court ultimately granted the Station Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which dismissed all of Murphy’s claims.
Murphy appealed, arguing that “by reproducing the Image on the two websites without the [magazine] credit identifying him as the author, the Station Defendants violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.” Id. at 9. In turn, the Station Defendants argued that the § 1202 cause of action could not survive because the gutter credit was not an “automated copyright protection or management system” – in essence claiming that the activity proscribed by § 1202 was limited only to digital information embedded within the work, not to any information that appeared “near the Image” in question. Id. at 10, 19.
Trial Court’s Opinion
In its opinion granting the Station Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Summary Judgment Opinion, ECF No. 43, Mar. 31, 2010), the trial court concluded that a “photography credit in the gutter of a print magazine . . . was in no way a ‘component of an automated copyright protection or management system'” as required by an earlier case in the same court (IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006)). Moreover, it opined that “the fact that a [magazine] employee used a software program to compose the page and insert the gutter credit does not bring this case into the scope of the DMCA.” Summary Judgment Opinion, ECF No. 43 at 6-7. Specifically, “[t]he DMCA should not be construed to cover copyright management performed by people, which is covered by the Copyright Act, as it preceded the DMCA; it should be construed to protect copyright management performed by technological measures of automated systems.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
The Appeal
Murphy appealed claiming numerous errors in the trial court’s opinion, among them that the court erred when it determined that § 1202 required the tampering with electronic copyright management information.
This appears to be a case of first impression. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group, No. 10-2163, at 10-11 (3d Cir.). In its opinion vacating the trial court’s opinion and sent the case back for further proceedings, the appeals court focused its analysis of the DMCA issue largely on the issue of whether “the definition of ‘copyright management information’ should be restricted to the context of ‘automated copyright protection or management systems'” as defendants argued, and as the trial court opined. Id. at 12.
Remember that this case involves a photograph copied from its paper form – not an electronic image. Indeed, the radio station employee created the scanned copy (without copying the gutter credits or the caption that the magazine prepared). Thus, the image that the Station Defendants copied was not in electronic form when the copy was made.
However, is a digital image required in order to invoke the DMCA? Both the Station Defendants and Murphy agreed that “whatever CMI is, it is not necessary for it to be digital. For example, they concede that a bar code printed in ink on a paper label might be CMI.” Id. at 17 n.11. Their dispute focuses on whether the CMI must function “in connection with an electronic or automated copyright protection or management system” or whether it can appear in a variety of forms. Id. at 17 n.12.
The appellate court’s opinion focuses a great deal on the statutory construction of § 1201 of the DMCA (which requires the “circumvention of technological measures” – a phrase that does not appear in § 1202). In addition, the court noted that § 1202 explicitly defines copyright management information to include information ‘conveyed in connection with copies . . . of a work . . . including in digital form . . . .” In addition, nothing about the statute indicates that § 1201 and § 1202 have to be interpreted as interrelated. “Instead, to all appearances, § 1201 and § 1202 establish independent causes of action which arise from different conduct on the part of defendants, albeit with similar civil remedies and criminal penalties.” Id. at 13.
Ultimately, the appellate court concluded that “a cause of action under § 1202 of the DMCA potentially lies whenever the types of information listed in § 1202(c)(1) – (8) and ‘conveyed in connection with copies . . . .of a work . . . including in digital form’ is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in which the information is conveyed.” Id. at *22 (emphasis added). This essentially means that copying a work appearing in hard copy form by transforming it into a digital version – but omitting any credit details that appeared with the work in its hard copy form, can qualify as the basis for a cause of action under § 1202.
Further Activity in the Case
Note that this appeal only addressed whether the gutter credit information could qualify as “copyright management information,” thus permitting an application of § 1202 to the analysis. It does not address whether or not other aspects of the DMCA claim can be met, as this claim was not presented to the appellate court for consideration. It remains to be seen whether plaintiff’s claim on this cause of action can survive after this initial victory.
The appeal also addressed the copyright infringement and defamation claims, as well as the trial court’s cursory analysis of both in its Summary Judgment Opinion. Without going into detail here, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in finding that the Station Defendants’ use of the unaltered photograph constituted fair use (Id. at 20-27) and in declining to permit discovery into the defamation claim (Id. at 28-30). Both of these decisions were vacated and the case has been remanded for further proceedings.
The next scheduled event on the trial court’s docket – now that the case has been remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – is a status conference set for September 14, 2011. ECF No. 56, Aug. 31, 2011. It appears that during a Rule 16 scheduling conference held on August 30, the parties mentioned pending settlement discussions, as correspondence sent to the court indicates that additional discussions will be held on September 9. Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the “first sale doctrine” cannot be used as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement where the defendant distributed copies in the U.S. of the plaintiff’s works that were manufactured in a foreign country. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 09-4896-CV, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 16830 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2011).
First Sale Doctrine, Defined
Under U.S. law, a defendant can avoid liability in copyright infringement case if what he or she distributed was a copy of the work that was obtained legitimately. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). In other words, once you purchase a paperback copy of a book, you may sell your copy of that book at any price you determine is fair without violating the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to distribute its works. This is called the “first sale doctrine.” This defense is generally described as follows: “the owner if a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .” Id. There is a separate provision for sound recordings and computer programs, but it is not applicable here. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
According to the Second Circuit, this defense is only available when the work at issue was made in the U.S. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 09-4896-CV at 16 (“In sum, we hold that the phrase ‘lawfully made under this Title” in § 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to works that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.”).
Facts of the John Wiley & Sons Case
In John Wiley & Sons, the defendant, Supap Kirtsaeng was a Thai student who first attended Cornell University, and then moved to California to pursue a doctoral degree. Between 2007 and September 2008, Kirtsaeng allegedly funded his educational expenses by receiving foreign edition textbooks from his family and friends in Thailand, and then selling them on commercial sites such as eBay. He reimbursed his family and friends for their acquisition and shipping costs and kept the profits for himself. Apparently, Kirtsaeng received about $1.2 million in revenue, a fact he tried to withhold from the jury as unduly prejudicial (see below). Id. at 7. In his defense of the lawsuit that followed, Kirtsaeng claimed that he had sought advice from friends in Thailand and on the Internet (using “Google Answers“) to determine that his actions would be lawful. (Factual discussion appears in the opinion in pages 4-5).
Complaint & Trial
On September 8, 3008, the textbook publisher, John Wiley & Sons, filed suit in the federal district court in Manhattan (Southern District of New York) claiming copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. § 501) and trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)) under federal law, and unfair competition under New York state law. John Wiley & Sons sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) and statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). At trial, the jury found Kirtsaeng “liable for willful copyright infringement of all eight works and imposed damages of $75,000 for each of the eight works.” Id. at 8. Kirtsaeng appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”), alleging that the judge erred in (1) finding the “first sale defense” not to apply to this situation; (2) in not instructing the jury that the “first sale doctrine” constituted a complete defense to the claims and (3) allowing certain evidence to be introduced regarding his gross receipts, which he claimed to be improper and unduly prejudicial.
Available Precedent
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered both Quality King Distr., Inc. v. L’anza Res. Int’l, Inc. (523 U.S. 135 (1998)) and Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008)) as potential precedent, and found both to be inapposite. Quality King dealt with works that were made in the U.S. for export to other countries, being returned to the U.S. and sold without authorization by the copyright owner. In that case, in a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsberg explained, “This case involves a ’round trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to places abroad, then back again” and explicitly noted that “we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad.” Id. at 11 (citing Quality King Distr., Inc. v. L’anza Res. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998)). As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that Quality King did not address precisely the situation posted by the John Wiley case, although its analysis could be borrowed for guidance about what the Supreme Court might do were this issue squarely presented before it.
The Second Circuit also considered a recent decision from the Ninth Circuit, Omega S.A. v. Costco, for the proposition that the first sale doctrine (§ 109(a)) “does not apply to items manufactured outside of the United States unless they were previously imported and sold in the United States with the copyright holder’s permission.” Id. at 12 (citing Omega S.A., 541 F.3d at 990). This case had been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment by an equally divided panel (with Justice Kagan recused). In other words, four of the nine justices voted to overturn the opinion, but without a majority of votes, the opinion was essentially affirmed.
Court’s Ruling
In reaching its ruling, the Second Circuit conceded that the statutory text was simply “utterly ambiguous.” Id. at 15. The phrase “lawfully made under this title” could mean any of the following: “(1) ‘manufactured in the United States,’ (2) ‘any work made that is subject to protection under this title,’ or (3) lawfully made under this title had this title been applicable.'” The last two meanings would have supported Kirtsaeng’s position, but the court explained, “these definitions, like Wiley’s, are at best merely consistent with a textual reading of § 109(a)” but are not mandated by the statute. Id.
Following its analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that it was most appropriate to “adopt an interpretation of § 109(a) that best comports with both § 602(a)(1) and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King.” Id. (Section 602(a)(1) provides that unauthorized importation into the U.S. of works that were acquired outside the U.S. constitutes infringement.) The Second Circuit explained that the “mandate of § 602(a)(1) . . . would have no force in the vast majority of cases if the first sale doctrine was interpreted to apply to every work manufactured abroad that was either made” under definition number 2 (“subject to protection under Title 17”) or 3 (“consistent with the requirements of Title 17 had Title 17 been applicable”) above. Thus, the only definition that could apply – and still allow § 602(a)(1) to have any teeth – must be definition number (1) (“manufactured in the U.S.”).
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit also distinguished the Omega v. Costco decision by finding that it was based largely on Ninth Circuit precedent that has not been widely adopted by other appellate courts.
As to the remaining bases for appeal, the Second Circuit held that it “could not conclude that the District Court plainly erred in declining to give Kirtsaeng’s proposed jury instruction” and “we see no reason to conclude that the District Court’s decision [regarding admission of evidence of Kirtsaeng’s gross revenues] was improper under Rule 403(b).” Id. at 18, 20.
Accordingly, all three of Kirtsaeng’s arguments failed and he lost the appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
The Honorable J. Garvan Murtha, a Vermont district court judge sitting by designation, filed a dissenting opinion, basically concluding that “the first sale doctrine should apply to a copy of a work that enjoys United States copyright protection wherever manufactured.” Id. at 1 (dissent). As in the majority opinion, the dissent focused on the “lawfully made under this title” phrase, and noted a circuit split over the interpretation of this phrase. One definition (as articulated by the majority) adopted the “legally manufactured . . . within the United States” construct. Id. at 2 (dissent). The other (to which Judge Murtha subscribed) “refers not to the place a copy is manufactured but the lawfulness of its manufacture as a function of U.S. copyright law.” Id. at 3 (dissent).
Judge Murtha described his disagreement rather plainly:
Id. (dissent) at 3. Under this construct, therefore, the first sale doctrine should apply to exempt Kirtsaeng from liability for copyright infringement for distributing these valid copies of a U.S. copyrighted work that he acquired lawfully before further selling them.
Judge Murtha further supported his position by relying on the initial Supreme Court case that articulated the first sale defense, in which the Court held that the “defendant-retailer’s sales of a copyrighted book for less than the price noted on the copyright page was not a copyright violation.” Id. at 4 (dissent) (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908)). “The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.” Id. at 4-5 (dissent) (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350). Thus, the copyright owner cannot control the terms of subsequent sales, if the initial sale was authorized.
In sum, Judge Murtha pointed to the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance as to its views of the Ninth Circuit’s “imperfect solution” in the Omega case because at least four justices “did not agree
the Quality King dicta [by Justice Ginsberg, cited above] directly addresses [this issue] or constitutes the Court’s current view.” Id. at 8 (dissent). In his view, they would have overturned the Omega decision, which was upheld only because it was not overturned by a majority of votes of the justices. Thus, while this is a “close call,” it should have been decided the other way — that the first sale doctrine applies to foreign manufactured copies. Id.
Conclusion
Given the circuit split articulated by the dissent, the statutory text’s “utter ambiguity” as conceded by the majority and the Supreme Court’s narrow upholding of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Omega case, it is possible that this issue may see further consideration by the Supreme Court. This, of course, assumes that either Kirtsaeng further appeals or another case with similar facts is presented for the Supreme Court’s consideration – and that the Supreme Court grants certiorari.
Until then, future litigants should consider whether the John Wiley & Sons case operates as binding precedent to their case or whether under the facts and circumstances presented, the first sale doctrine (despite foreign manufacture of the works at issue) could act as a defense to claims of copyright infringement for the subsequent sale of a validly obtained copy.
Yesterday, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a business meeting which was scheduled for purposes of discussing certain nominations and markups to at least two bills: 1) S.968, Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (“PROTECT IP Act”) (sponsored by Leahy, Hatch, Grassley, Kohl, Feinstein, Schumer, Graham, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Franken, Coons, Blumenthal); and 2) S.978, A bill to amend the criminal penalty provision for criminal infringement of a copyright, and for other purposes (Klobuchar, Cornyn, Coons). A discussion of S. 978 was held over until the next meeting.
The meeting was not open to the public and was not simulcast, but an audio file of the meeting is now available on the Committee’s site, along with the agenda. Senators Leahy and Franken have also published their prepared remarks on the Committee’s site. (UPDATE: A webcast of the Executive Business Meeting is now available on the site.)
During the meeting, Senators Leahy, Hatch and Grassley offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and Senators Leahy and Grassley offered an additional amendment. Both of these were made available on the Senate Judiciary Committee’s main site, although I imagine they will be moved at some point in the near future (once there is more current news to publish on the main site).
Both amendments passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on a 10-0 Voice Vote. Following the announcement that the Bill had passed the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Senator Wyden announced a hold on the Bill, commenting that while “I understand and agree with the goal of the legislation, to protect intellectual property and combat commerce in counterfeit goods, . . . I am not willing to muzzle speech and stifle innovation and economic growth to achieve this objective.” An interesting article in Wired.com identifies the “hold” process as “rarely used” in the Senate, but effectively blocking the Bill from “landing” on the Senate floor.
Statements of several organizations on both sides of the fence on this issue can be found as follows (below are excerpts of the various statements, please click the links to their full statements to get complete context):
IN FAVOR
OPPOSED
The House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet held a hearing on “Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II” on April 6, 2011, to further examine methods of theft online – including both copyright infringement and counterfeiting. The webcast can be found on the Committee’s web site. Although a transcript of the proceedings (and any supplemental questions and answers) are not yet available, when they are published, they should appear in the Government Printing Office’s repository: House Committee on the Judiciary: Hearings – 112th Congress.
Testifying before the Subcommittee were Hon. John Morton, Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Floyd Abrams, a First Amendment expert who testified on his own behalf; Kent Walker, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for Google; and Christine Jones, Executive Vice President and General Counsel for the GoDaddy Group. (Their prepared remarks can be found by following the links associated with each of their names.)
At the opening of the hearing, Rep. Goodlatte (Va.) explained the basic purpose of the hearing (to examine methods of theft online) and clarified a misunderstanding that had arisen after the last hearing on March 14. He explained that although ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) had seized domain names in the recent few months, those seizures were based on existing law – particularly the Pro-IP Act enacted several years ago.
In contrast, this hearing and any proposed legislation resulting from it was intended to find new tools to address theft online — existing laws did not provide enough enforcement tools. Many of the websites being discussed as “rogue” websites in these hearings are foreign-based and/or -operated. Thus, there is no property in the U.S. at issue, and the sites could not simply be “seized” by ICE. He concluded, “any efforts to pass new legislation will not be based on seizure laws and process because there is no property in the U.S. to be seized. Thus, new tools are needed to address theft online.” (All of the quotes taken from the hearing for this blog post are paraphrased, not exact transcriptions, as a transcript is not yet available. But, they’re close.)
Rep. Watt (N.C.) put the discussion into a neat container: we need to deter “theft of products online as we protected against theft of property on the ground. What might romantically be referred to as ‘piracy,’ we refer in my neighborhood as ‘theft’ or simply, ‘stealing.'”
Rep. Conyers (Mich.) asked simply: “Why don’t we just cut off all the money? Why don’t we eliminate some of the financial incentives by cutting off the funding from customer through the payment processing system, or cut off the funding from some of the advertising networks?” He also suggested considering a private right of action, noting that the suggestion was “almost unheard of.” Finally, he admonished that “[w]e need to use this hearing as another opportunity to come up with some legislation we can be proud of.”
Following these introductions, each of the witnesses was given five minutes to summarize the testimony that they had prepared, and proceeded to answer questions posed to them by the participating representatives of the House. The hearing lasted about 3½ hours, and it’s impossible to do it complete justice here. The questions and answers, and the various speeches made by some participants, were detailed and enthusiastic. I’d encourage you to watch the whole thing.
In the meantime, some highlights:
ICE Director John Morton expressed great concern that all of American industry is “under assault” right now and repeatedly argued that government enforcement should only be one “tool in the toolbox,” but simply could not address effectively every act of infringement or counterfeiting. Industry has to be involved. In essence, he said, “[w]hat you’ve heard, though, is that industry can do a lot more, on a greater scale than the government ever can. We are part of the solution, we are not THE solution, not by a long shot.” He further explained the context in which the ICE domain seizures had occurred, noting that they were made under existing legislation, but are ineffective against a foreign website with foreign operators, because of jurisdictional limits.
Floyd Abrams, Esquire, addressed applicable First Amendment principles and recommended that any legislation must be narrowly drafted so that it’s addressing only those sites that are “all but totally infringing. . . . if the entity is nothing but a transmitter of infringing products, you are permitted to deal with it as long as the remedy is not overbroad.” He recommended that the Committee use existing regimes such as Rule 65 (of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) governing injunctions and temporary restraining orders and the Copyright Law’s enforcement mechanisms, and not to “start from scratch.”
Kent Walker, Esquire, explained Google’s point of view, and responded to numerous questions throughout the hearing. Specifically, he testified:
Ms. Jones agreed that input from the content industry was critical, but argued that it did not end the analysis:
Reaction by various members of the Committee was mixed, and they had their own suggestions of how an enforcement tool could be fashioned and provided observations of some of the challenges to be faced. Among them:
Many more thoughtful comments and suggestions were made by other members of the Committee and the witnesses, and I again encourage you to watch the webcast.
Finally, while it is not clear what the Subcommittee will do with all of this information and these suggestions, Mr. Adams had the right approach when he suggested, “all we can do is everything we can to drain the actions of this sort of the profits that have been building up over the years, and increasing more and more as time passes.” As Director Morton opined, ” We have to do something. My perspective is, do nothing and you fail.”
Prior posts in this blog on other hearings on a potential, new COICA bill (Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act) can be found under the label COICA.